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HAS THE SUPREME COURT CONFESSED
ERROR ON THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT?
REVISIONIST SCHOLARSHIP AND
STATE IMMUNITY
GEORGE D. BRowN*
The simple text of the eleventh amendment belies the complexity of
the jurisprudence surrounding it. Professor George D. Brown uses the
United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co. as a jumping-off point to determine where the Court
stands today on the delicate balance between national supremacy and
state sovereignty. In the divided Court's endorsement of congressional
power to abrogate the states' immunity he detects a shift toward national
supremacy. Professor Brown finds abrogation theory to be as problem-
atic as what came before it. Nevertheless, he accepts the current frame-
work as a compromise that protects state treasuries on the one hand,
while advancing enforcement offederal substantive norms on the other.
The compromise is a shaky one, and Professor Brown expects the Court
to continue wrestling with the doctrinal difficulties surrounding the elev-
enth amendment.
I. INTRODUCTION
"Better to overrule Hans, I should think, than to perpetuate the complexi-
ties that it creates .... but eliminate all its benefits to the federal system."
Justice Antonin Scalia'
The thrust of most recent federal courts scholarship is that the Burger-
Rehnquist Court is almost always wrong on just about everything. The Court's
decisions on standing,2 abstention in favor of state proceedings, 3 implied rights
of action,4 Bivens remedies,5 and the eleventh amendment 6 all have been the
subject of constant, often withering, academic criticism. 7 A classic example is
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. The research for this article was supported
by a Boston College Law School Dean's Fund Grant.
1. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2299 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
2. E.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
3. Eg., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
4. E.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
5. E.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983). Under the doctrine of Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), a person whose constitutional
rights have been violated by a federal official may sue that official for damages even though there is
no statute which authorizes such a remedy.
6. E.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
7. E.g., Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 635
(1985) (criticizing standing decisions); Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of
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the field of eleventh amendment law. In case after case the Court's conservative
justices have mustered a majority to take this seemingly narrow provision-the
amendment bars suits against states in federal courts by noncitizens and foreign-
ers- and turn it into a formidable barrier to federal suits against states by their
own citizens.8 Most of these cases have generated bitter division within the
Court itself. The dissents by liberal justices have loomed large in the literature. 9
In a duet of mutual appreciation, later dissents cite as authority articles praising
the earlier ones. 10 In volume alone the criticism has reached such a level that
the Court seemingly cannot ignore it.II
Some of the attacks follow two general themes of federal courts scholarship.
The Court is seen as abandoning the constitutionally mandated role of the na-
tional judiciary in the vindication of national rights. 12 Worse yet, it does so in
the name of federalism, even though everyone knows that state institutions can-
not be trusted.13 In the eleventh amendment context, however, the conservative
majority is vulnerable on several particular counts as well. Its use of the amend-
ment does not square with the constitutional text.14 The frequent invocation of
history to expand that text rests on shaky ground.15 Eleventh amendment doc-
the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984) (criticizing abstention decisions); Steinman, Backing
off Bivens and the Ramifications of this Retreat for the Vindication of First Amendment Rights, 83
MICH. L. REV. 269 (1984) (criticizing denials of damages for constitutional violations by federal
officials). Major articles criticizing the Court's eleventh amendment decisions are: Amar, Of Sover.
eignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sover-
eign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1977); Field, The Eleventh
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit Upon the
States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203 (1978) [hereinafter Field, Part II]; Fletcher, A Historical Interpreta-
tion of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction
Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033 (1983); Gibbons, The Elev-
enth Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889
(1983); Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98
YALE L.J. 1 (1988); Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HAV. L. REV.
1342 (1989); Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L.
REv. 61 (1989); Shapiro, Wrong Turns.- The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98
HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984). In this Article I have grouped all of these writings together under the
heading of revisionist scholarship. Whatever differences may exist among them, these authors all
contend that the decision in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), the source of modem eleventh
amendment doctrine, is incorrect in result and/or rationale and must be reconsidered. For a discus-
sion of Hans, see infra text accompanying notes 44-47.
8. E.g., Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818 (1989) (bar-
ring monetary recovery against state in federal court under Bankruptcy Act); Dellmuth v. Muth, 109
S. Ct. 2397 (1989) (barring reimbursement award against state in federal court under Education of
the Handicapped Act); Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987)
(plurality opinion) (denying damages award against state in federal court under Jones Act); Atas-
cadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (barring damages award against state in federal
court under Rehabilitation Act); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (barring compensatory
relief against state in federal court under Social Security Act; prospective injunctive relief upheld).
9. E.g., Gibbons, supra note 7, at 1893 (Justice Brennan's interpretation of amendment only
one consistent with language, history, and early interpretation).
10. E.g.,Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 258 n.l, 261 n.12, 265 n.15, 270 n.22, 277 n.26, 279 n.29, 284
n.35 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Gibbons, supra note 7, as guide to history of amendment).
11. See, eg., id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
12. E.g., Amar, supra note 7, at 1504-06.
13. E.g., id. at 1477-79, 1483.
14. E.g., Marshall, supra note 7, at 1346-47.
15. E.g., id. at 1349-71.
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trine perpetuates discredited notions of sovereign immunity. 16 Finally, the elev-
enth amendment cases have generated a highly complex body of technical
doctrines whose inconsistencies invite easy derision as "a hodgepodge of confus-
ing and intellectually indefensible judge-made law." 17
The main target of this extensive literature is the 1890 decision of Hans v.
Louisiana 18 and the current Court's insistence that Hans should be followed
and, indeed, expanded. 19 Hans was a suit in federal court by a citizen against his
own state. The Court held that although the amendment on its face bars only
suits by noncitizens and foreigners, the spirit and history of the amendment re-
flect a broader, fundamental hostility to suits against states in federal court by
anyone. 20 The critics would overrule Hans, and every case that applied it.21
This Article examines whether the Court has, even if indirectly, accepted
the revisionist view. The particular focus is on the Court's current position that
Congress can "abrogate" the states' eleventh amendment shield.22 The cases
hold that citizens can sue their states in federal court if Congress has passed a
statute that explicitly authorizes the particular suit. This position poses serious
doctrinal problems. On the one hand, to put the matter this way indicates that
there is something to abrogate. Indeed, the Court has insisted that recognizing
some degree of congressional power is consistent with Hans and the constitu-
tional principle that it establishes. 23 On the other hand, if the amendment gives
to the states an immunity with a constitutional status, it is hard to see how a
mere statute can take it away.24 After considering the Court's attempts to re-
solve this dilemma, the Article considers the alternative approach of treating
state immunity as less than constitutional in status, a kind of "constitutional
common law" perhaps. The Court may well recast the eleventh amendment
debate in subconstitutional terms.25 To do so would clarify a number of per-
plexing issues. It would also, however, recognize the substantial inroads of abro-
gation theory upon the core principles of Hans. The Court has so far resisted
doing this, perhaps feeling that Hans and abrogation can coexist peacefully.
Accepting the concept of congressional abrogation of the eleventh amend-
ment, regardless of whether state immunity is of constitutional status, raises in
16. E.g., Shapiro, supra note 7, at 71-76.
17. Gibbons, supra note 7, at 1891; see also Amar, supra note 7, at 1480 ("in law, as in logic,
anything can be derived from a contradiction"); Fletcher, supra note 7, at 1044 (eleventh amend-
ment jurisprudence has become a "complicated, jerry-built system that is fully understood only by
those who specialize in this difficult field").
18. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
19. E.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 486-87 (1987) (plu-
rality opinion).
20. Hans, 134 U.S. at 12-19.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 36-75.
22. See e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989) (plurality opinion); Fitzpat-
rick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
23. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456 (Congress may abrogate under fourteenth amendment because
that provision limits the eleventh amendment. Citizen suits against states would be "constitutionally
impermissible in other contexts.").
24. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2286 (Stevens, J., concurring).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 157-78.
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turn questions of limits on Congress' ability to do so. The Article next considers
whether there ought to be limits and whether their existence depends on which
of its powers Congress has used and/or on the degree of clarity with which it has
spoken. As to the first issue, the question has been whether Congress can abro-
gate only when legislating pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, or whether it
can do so in the exercise of any of its article I powers. The Article argues that
the recent decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.26 does not provide a defini-
tive answer. While that case holds that Congress may utilize the commerce
power to abrogate, the issue still must be viewed as open. As for the question of
clear statement requirements, that is even more of a battleground. It was at
issue in five cases decided last term alone.27 This Article's concern is primarily
with where the Court derives the authority to impose clear statement rules. One
must consider whether the Court has erected requirements of clear statement of
congressional intent to abrogate that are inconsistent with its concession that
Congress has the power to do so.
That the search for limits looks very much like trying to have things both
ways raises a final question: who wins under abrogation analysis? The view
advanced here is that abrogation analysis represents a strong tilt toward the
supremacy of national power over concern for state sovereignty. 28 It is thus
consistent with one of the main themes of revisionist scholarship.29 It is true
that the states have something until Congress takes it away, but Congress must
always take some action before a federal court can hear a case. No federal suit
of any kind is possible unless a congressional statute has provided federal juris-
diction over the matter, and, in most cases, provided a right of action as well.
Thus the significant point is not that Congress must act, but that it can act to
take away the eleventh amendment shield.
Justice Brennan was the author of the plurality opinion in Union Gas. The
decision upholds an abrogation under the commerce power.30 For Justice
Scalia, permitting abrogation under an article I power was a de facto overruling
of Hans.31 Yet Justice Brennan purported to achieve this result while keeping
the Hans structure intact.32 As noted, the eleventh amendment generates an
attempt to have things both ways. In Union Gas five justices opted for process
limits only: requirements of clear statement.33 Four of these justices, however,
26. 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
27. Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818 (1989); Missouri v.
Jenkins, 109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989); Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397 (1989); Union Gas, 109 S. Ct.
2273 (1989). Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989), involved the construc-
tion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). However, the Court used an eleventh amendment analysis to reach
a narrow construction. Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2308-09; see id. at 2314 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticiz-
ing Court for utilizing methodology "unique to cases involving the Eleventh Amendment").
28. See Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How the Eleventh Amendment Sur-
vived the Death of the Tenth: Some Broader Implications ofAtascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 74
GEo. L.J. 363, 393-94 (1985) (predicting Court would back down in favor of national power).
29. Marshall, supra note 7, at 1352-53.
30. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2280-86 (plurality opinion).
31. Id. at 2299 (Scalia, 3., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32. Id. at 2277 (plurality opinion).
33. That the clear statement rule is the applicable limit and is satisfied is the position of the
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really want to overrule Hans altogether.34 Four other justices would have gone
further in the direction of limits and accorded Congress power to abrogate under
the fourteenth amendment but not under article 1.35 Balancing concerns of na-
tional supremacy with concerns of state sovereignty can never be done to the
satisfaction of both sides. Abrogation analysis is an attempt at compromise.
The Court still could move in either direction, but Hans emerges as seriously
wounded.
II. REVISIONISM REVISITED
At this point, a brief outline of the revisionist critique is in order. The
views of the academic proponents of abrogation theory will also be considered in
an effort to determine whether their position is simply one strain of revisionism
or a different way of looking at the eleventh amendment problem.
A. Revisionist Themes
Revisionists start with the text.36 The eleventh amendment was adopted in
response to Chisholm v. Georgia.37 Chisholm held that a contract suit against a
state by a citizen of another state was properly brought in federal court.3 8  The
Court found the case squarely within article III because that article extends the
judicial power to suits "between a State and Citizens of another State. .... -39
The amendment that was adopted five years after Chisholm provides that "[t]he
judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 4
The amendment thus seems squarely directed at Chisholm-type suits (and
those by foreigners). Moreover, it "amends" the very constitutional language,
more precisely the Court's construction of the language, that permitted the re-
sult in Chisholm. For the revisionists this is an open and shut case: the amend-
plurality opinion of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at
2277-80 (plurality opinion). The latter's separate concurring opinion, however, does express doubts
about eleventh amendment doctrine in general. Id. at 2286-89 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
White provided the fifth vote for the proposition that Congress had power to abrogate and that the
clear statement rule was thus applicable. Id. at 2295 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). He did
not find the clear statement rule met, however. Id. at 2289-94 (White, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). The fifth vote for this proposition was Justice Scalia's. Id. at 2295-96 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). He, however, would have denied Congress the power to abrogate, as
would Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Id. at 2296-2303 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a discussion of Union Gas, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 134-52.
34. In Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397 (1989), Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens repeated their view that Hans should be overruled. Id. at 2403 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2302 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Scalia was joined on this point by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy.
36. Kg., Marshall, supra note 7, at 1342-43.
37. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
38. The case was brought in the Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction.
39. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
40. U.S. CONSr. amend. XI.
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ment means only what it says.4 1 Most importantly, the amendment says
nothing about suits by citizens against their own states. Such suits would have
to be brought under federal question jurisdiction. 42 The amendment does not
speak to federal question jurisdiction. Thus, citizen suits remain within the judi-
cial power.43
Hans went beyond literalism to bar a citizen's suit against his own state.
The Court found in the amendment a broad policy against suing states in federal
court. The states never would have ratified the amendment, the Court reasoned,
if it were understood to permit citizen suits against them.44 Moreover, the origi-
nal Constitution was drafted and ratified at a time when general understandings
of sovereign immunity would have barred federal court suits against noncon-
senting states.45 The current Court has emphasized the historical correctness of
Hans in perpetuating and extending that case. The conservative majority has
relied in part on the fact that supporters of the original Constitution disclaimed
any notions that states could be sued in federal court. 46 It also has relied on the
swiftness with which the eleventh amendment was adopted, a product of the
"shock" that supposedly greeted Chisholm, as grounds for a broad construction
emphasizing the amendment's spirit.47
It is precisely on the field of history that the revisionists have waged their
most extensive battle against Hans and the current Court.48 As a starting point,
they perhaps need only to demonstrate that the historical record is uncertain. If
so, the plain language of the amendment ought to prevail given the impossibility
of knowing the relevant intent.49 However, the revisionists go further. History
demonstrates that there was no background understanding that state sovereign
immunity was part of the Constitution. Indeed, "the majority of those who
commented on the issue concluded that the Constitution did subject states to
suits in federal courts." 50 Chisholm was correct in finding jurisdiction. Because
it was a state law case, however, the Court should have recognized a common-
law defense of sovereign immunity.5 1
As for the eleventh amendment, it was designed to overturn the result in
Chisholm, not to enshrine any general concept of state sovereign immunity.
41. Eg., Amar, supra note 7, at 1475; Shreve, Letting Go of the Eleventh Amendnent, 64 IND.
L.J. 601, 608-10 (1989).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
43. There is, however, a dispute among revisionists over whether a noncitizen should be able to
bring a federal question suit against a state in federal court. See Shreve, supra note 41, at 610-11.
This nontextual approach weakens the general revisionist case. See Marshall, The Diversity Theory
of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1380 (1989).
44. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
45. Id. at 12-19.
46. Eg., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 n.2 (1985).
47. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 485 n.17 (1987)
(plurality opinion).
48. The most detailed treatment in the law review articles of the historical points is that of
Judge Gibbons, supra note 7.
49. Marshall, supra note 7, at 1349-51.
50. Id. at 1350.
51. Amar, supra note 7, at 1467-73.
[Vol. 68
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
Suits by out-of-staters were those most in the public mind and those that the
states feared most.5 2 There existed at least one proposal for blanket immunity; it
was not adopted by Congress. 53 The possibility of federal question suits against
states, at least by their own citizens, was not part of the debate. Congress had
not conferred general federal question jurisdiction. 54 The amendment is not
even directed at this issue.55 Thus the revisionists confront the Court on what
seems to be its strongest ground, and an essential one as well, if the language of
the amendment does not control. The validity of this critique is widely ac-
cepted, at least in academic circles. 56
Whether one accepts the revisionists' critique, they certainly have raised
substantial doubts about the soundness of Hans and its progeny. These doubts
are reinforced by post-Hans eleventh amendment doctrine, which is complex,
confusing, and often inconsistent. 57 The Court has felt compelled to recognize
some need for national supremacy. Thus suits by the United States against
states may be brought in federal court despite the amendment's supposed policy
against making states defend themselves in that forum. 58 Particularly vexatious
are the rules about suing a state officer. Ex parte Young 59 held that such suits
could be brought if the officer was alleged to be acting in violation of the federal
Constitution. This violation would "strip" him of his state authority, although
he still would be acting under color of state law.6° Subsequent cases have admit-
ted that Young is a fiction and have narrowed its rule to cases in which the state
is the real party in interest but the plaintiff seeks only prospective injunctive
relief.61 Prospective claims against the officer based on state law cannot be ap-
pended, even though the initial suit is valid under Young and the requirements
of pendent jurisdiction are met.62 All of these "doctrinal gymnastics and legal
fictions," 63 in the words of one critic, demonstrate for the revisionists the folly of
proceeding from incorrect constitutional premises. One view is that the results
are simply wrong, that the states get too much immunity. 64 Another view em-
phasizes the danger of the judiciary's undermining its own legitimacy by "formal
52. Marshall, supra note 7, at 1353-71.
53. Amar, supra note 7, at 1481; Jackson, supra note 7, at 46. Under the amendment process,
Congress had to agree on the constitutional language to overturn Chisholm before any proposal
could be put to the states. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
54. See C. WRIoHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 90 (4th ed. 1983).
55. See Fletcher, supra note 7, at 1077-78.
56. See Jackson, supra note 7, at 4-5, 44 n.179.
57. Professor William Marshall describes the world of eleventh amendment jurisprudence as
"relentlessly ambiguous." Marshall, supra note 43, at 1372-73 n.5.
58. Eg., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
59. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
60. Id. at 159.
61. Eg., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The Court in Edelman admitted that the
line between prospective and retrospective relief is not always clear. Id. at 667. It is also true that
prospective relief can have a substantial effect on state treasuries, just as damages would. Id. at 667-
68.
62. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
63. Amar, supra note 7, at 1478.
64. Professor Amar's article is a strong statement of this view. See Amar, supra note 7, at
1483-84.
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adherence to a doctrine riddled with exceptions designed to counterbalance its
evils."'65 All agree that the only way out of the present morass is to overrule
Hans and begin again.66
Text, history, and the vagaries of post-Hans policy are the main revisionist
themes, but they are not the only ones. One critique is structural: any recogni-
tion of state immunity from suit in federal court thwarts the constitutional goal
of "coextensiveness ofjudicial and legislative power."' 67 It makes no sense to say
that Congress has broad reach in regulating state governments, as it surely does
after Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,6 8 but that the federal
courts are not equally available to enforce those regulations. Perhaps more fun-
damental is the critique that the Court's current position perpetuates notions of
sovereign immunity, a doctrine which is increasingly discredited69 and at vari-
ance with the American concept of popular sovereignty. 70 On another level, it
has been argued that the Court's denial of federal trial court jurisdiction over
claims against states by their citizens is wholly at odds with its own assertion of
jurisdiction over appeals from such cases decided in state courts.71 Finally, the
eleventh amendment's denial of federal jurisdiction can be seen as a kind of ab-
stention under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris,72 which relegates the plaintiff
to state forums for an initial decision.73 Yet unlike Younger cases, there is no
analysis of how well these forums will handle federal issues74 and little analysis
of whether they will hear them at all.75
Revisionist scholarship is by no means monolithic. There is sharp disagree-
ment over whether the eleventh amendment prohibits federal question suits by
noncitizens or whether it merely abolishes the jurisdiction over noncitizen state
65. Jackson, supra note 7, at 7.
66. Id. at 17-18 & n.79; Shreve, supra note 41, at 608-15.
67. Amar, supra note 7, at 1483.
68. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Garcia the Court held that there are no state sovereignty limits on
congressional action that regulates the states. The only enforceable constitutional limit is whether
Congress has acted within the scope of its powers. Legislation affecting the wages of public-sector
employees was clearly within the commerce power. Id. at 537-47, 555-56.
69. See, eg., Shapiro, supra note 7, at 61-62.
70. Amar, supra note 7, at 1466-81.
71. This is the principal tenet of the article by Profesor Jackson, supra note 7. For agreement
with Jackson's thesis, see Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2288 n.3 (1989) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
72. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
73. Under the Younger doctrine a federal court will not hear a federal question case if the
plaintiff is a party in pending state proceedings raising the same issue, if there is an important state
interest in the proceedings, and if he has a full and fair opportunity to raise the federal issues in the
state forum. The plaintiff's only federal judicial recourse is the possibility of an appeal to the
Supreme Court from a final state disposition. Younger dismissals thus have the same practical effect
as eleventh amendment dismissals. Id. at 43-54.
74. E.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 n.14 (1977) (discussing state procedures which
would have permitted raising federal issues). In recent Younger cases the Court appears to have
moved toward a presumption that state procedures are adequate. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,
Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987) ("[A] federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an
adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.").
75. See Amar, supra note 7, at 1477-78 n.209 & n.21 1. Compare Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238-40 n.2 (1985) (suggesting state obligation to hear federal claims) vith
Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 488 (1987) (plurality opinion)
(listing plaintiffs' remedies, but omitting federal law suit against state in state court).
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law suits that article III originally granted.76 There is even disagreement over
whether the result in Hans is entirely bad, or whether something like it might be
reached as a matter of tenth amendment state sovereignty, article III judicial
power, or federal common law. 77 What is not in dispute among the large body of
commentators grouped together in this Article under the "revisionist" heading
is that the rationale of Hans-that the states' shield from federal suit is of consti-
tutional stature and derived, at least in part, from the eleventh amendment-has
to go.
B. Abrogation Theory-A Tenable Middle Ground?
At this point it is necessary to examine another branch of recent eleventh
amendment scholarship: the argument that the amendment is directed at the
federal courts rather than at Congress, and that it imposes few, if any, limits on
the latter body. Is abrogation theory simply revisionism by another name, or is
it a doctrinally defensible middle ground between Hans and its critics? The an-
swer to this question should help us understand the Court's current approach to
the eleventh amendment, since the Court appears to have accepted abrogation
theory as its starting point.
The principal proponents of an abrogationist reading of the amendment are
Professors Nowak and Tribe.78 They argue that both its history and text sup-
port treating Congress differently from the federal courts. The amendment is
seen as inspired by distrust of the latter.79 The language is directed at the
courts;80 it is they who construe the judicial power. This approach makes sense
because the amendment is concerned with state interests that are represented
and protected in Congress but not in the federal judiciary.8 Giving states par-
ticipation in the burdens they will bear is "the central tenet" of the amend-
ment.8 2 The upshot of this analysis is that Congress has power to remove
jurisdictional limits otherwise flowing from the amendment. It may do so under
any of its powers,8 3 although principles of clear statement do constrain it some-
what. These requirements ensure that state interests have been taken into
account.8 4
An initial question is whether the abrogationist critique is one more strand
of revisionism. It certainly reflects a principal theme of revisionism: that no-
76. See Marshall, supra note 7, at 1346-49 (discussing competing views).
77. See Jackson, supra note 7, at 72-104 (federal common law); Massey, supra note 7 (tenth
amendment state sovereignty); Shreve, supra note 41, at 612-15 (article III).
78. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Govern-
ments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413
(1975); Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of
Powers Issues in Controversies about Federalism, 89 HARV. L. Rv. 682 (1976). In this Article I
have cited the Tribe treatise for his most recent views. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw (2d ed. 1988).
79. E.g., Nowak, supra note 78, at 1430.
80. Eg., L. TRIBE, supra note 78, at 186.
81. See id.
82. Nowak, supra note 78, at 1449.
83. L. TRIBE, supra note 78, at 185-86.
84. Id. at 186-87.
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tions of national supremacy ultimately must prevail over notions of state sover-
eignty.8 5 On the other hand, neither Nowak nor Tribe appears to question the
correctness of Hans, although Tribe does say it is time to reexamine the entire
area of eleventh amendment doctrine. 86 The whole notion of abrogation seems
to rest on the premise that there is something to abrogate-that the eleventh
amendment does provide some sort of shield for states against the federal judi-
cial power.87 Both Tribe and Nowak make much of a supposed distinction be-
tween rights conferred against Congress and rights conferred against the federal
judiciary. Even so, to suggest that states have significant rights runs counter to
one major thrust of revisionist scholarship: that the amendment is limited in
scope, affecting only suits by noncitizens and foreigners.
Whether one is a revisionist or not, it must be admitted that the Nowak-
Tribe thesis has several fundamental weaknesses. The amendment's text does
not support their distinction. 88 It says that "the judicial power" does not extend
to certain suits. 89 If, post-Hans, those suits include federal actions by in-staters
they are not within the judicial power. 90 The amendment speaks to everyone.
Trying to derive support from "shall not be construed" is futile.9 1 Why those
words were inserted is not clear.92 Moreover, if Congress passes a jurisdictional
statute embracing suits against states the courts must "construe" the words as
permitting this.93 A major premise of the Nowak-Tribe argument is that Con-
gress is the national institution most likely to show concern for the states and to
protect them.94 The notion that Congress represents state interests may well be
wrong, given the focus on the national nature of the congressman's job as
legislator.95
Another problem is that Nowak and Tribe suggest that there is something
special about congressional action to confer jurisdiction in contrast with some
prior, self-executing stage of the federal judicial power. The eleventh amend-
ment imposes limits at this stage, but that immunity disappears when Congress
takes the next step of conferring jurisdiction.9 6 The federal courts have no juris-
diction until Congress confers it.97 That is the first step, and when taking it
Congress is constrained by the limits of article III. The argument, familiar since
85. Marshall, supra note 7, at 1352-53.
86. L. TRIBE, supra note 78, at 195.
87. See Jackson, supra note 7, at 45 n.180 (distinguishing Nowak and Tribe from revisionist
writers).
88. See id. at 42.
89. "The Judicialpower of the United States shall not be contrued to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONsT. amend. XI (emphasis added).
90. See, eg., Marshall, supra note 7, at 1348.
91. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added).
92. See Marshall, supra note 7, at 1348 n.26.
93. Id.
94. See, eg., L. TRIBE, supra note 78, at 186.
95. See Brown, supra note 28, at 375.
96. See, eg., L. TRIBE, supra note 78, at 185; Nowak, supra note 78, at 1422.
97. See, eg., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
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Marbury v. Madison,98 applies here: Congress cannot expand the jurisdiction of
the federal courts by conferring anything that is outside of article III. 99
The revisionists and the abrogationists arrive at more or less the same place:
Congress can make the states amenable to federally based suits by citizens in
federal courts. However, the revisionists get there by overruling Hans. They
thus avoid the serious doctrinal problems discussed above. Moreover, they are
not obliged to make the task any more difficult for Congress by imposing specific
rules of clear statement. The abrogationists take a more twisting route. Their
partial acceptance of Hans, and the requirement of special rules to lift state im-
munity, suggest that there may be something to be said for that case after all.
III. REVISIONISM AND THE COURT-IN SEARCH
OF AN ELUSIVE FIFTH VOTE
A. Pre-Union Gas-The Old Majority and The Old Debate
The conservative majority has never accepted the proposition that the vol-
ume of academic criticism creates a climate in which Hans should be reconsid-
ered.) ° These justices have relied on history10 1 (although admitting it may be
ambiguous), 10 2 policy, 10 3 and the values of stare decisis'1 4 in adhering to Hans.
Justice Brennan, on the other hand, has relied heavily on the revisionist writ-
ing. 10 5 He has invoked it to support his general proposition that the states have
only a nonconstitutional immunity from federal suit that Congress may always
remove because the states surrendered their sovereignty to it in the plan of the
Constitution. 10 6 He also invokes the criticisms as grounds for reconsidering the
whole matter.' 0 7 Justice Brennan speaks for a block of four anti-Hans
justices. 108
This Article argues that the majority is correct. To say that the matter is
controverted has the ring of a self-fulfilling prophecy when a principal source of
the controversy is Justice Brennan's own dissents. On a more fundamental level,
those critics who would allow federal lawsuits by noncitizens must engage in the
98. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
99. See, eg., Jackson, supra note 7, at 43.
100. E.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238-39 n.2 (1985) ("'[New evi-
dence' ... has been available... for almost two centuries.").
101. E.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 479-85 (1987) (plu-
rality opinion).
102. Id. at 482-84 (plurality opinion).
103. Id. at 486-88 (plurality opinion).
104. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2298 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
105. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 258-59 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Recent research shows Court's doctrine "has rested on a mistaken historical premise.").
106. For an early statement of his views, see Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Wel-
fare, 411 U.S. 279, 298 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. E.g., Welch, 483 U.S. at 521 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. See Dellmuth v.
Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2403 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (In action by father of child with
learning disability under Education of the Handicapped Act, Court held statute did not abrogate
Pennsylvania's immunity from suit.).
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same extratextual analysis for which they criticize the Court.'0 9 As for history,
the critics ignore the possibility that the eleventh amendment is an anti-federalist
component of the Constitution and should be construed as such. 10 It is not
surprising that the text is aimed at the types of suits with which the polity was
most familiar."' If no one was thinking about federal suits,112 their omission is
not surprising either. Moreover, it strains credulity to describe the amendment
as "a simple desire to effect a partial repeal of two technical diverse party
grants."1 3 The fundamental choice to amend the organic instrument is usually
generated by something more profound than concern about the arcana of federal
jurisdiction. To the extent that the constitutional plan requires some federal
judicial enforcement of federal norms, the Court's own tempering of the amend-
ment to permit a wide range of equitable relief may be a historically faithful
balancing of the competing policies. 114 In this respect it is worth noting that
several revisionists who criticize the reasoning in Hans concede that its result is
consistent with constitutional values and might be reached via other
rationales. 115
What is puzzling about the majority, then, is not its defense of Hans but its
failure to recognize the tension between abrogation theory and the Hans view of
the eleventh amendment. In the principal abrogation case, Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer,'1 6 Justice Rehnquist did make it a point to distinguish abrogation under
the fourteenth amendment from abrogation in the exercise of other powers. He
treated the amendment as an explicit alteration of the preexisting federal-state
balance.'1 7 Thus, Congress in enforcing it might "provide for private suits
against States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other
contexts."118
This is certainly a defensible limitation. 19 The problem is that abrogation
is not easily confined. Consider the spending power. If federal funds are ten-
dered on the condition that a state waive its eleventh amendment immunity, this
might be viewed as an unconstitutional condition, a de facto abrogation given
the illusory nature of the choice. 120 In Edelman v. Jordan,12 1 however, the
Court made it clear that Congress could induce such a waiver. Of course, this
109. See Marshall, supra note 43, at 1380.
110. Cf id. at 1388 (eleventh amendment's overruling of Chisholm "implicitly rejects the 'plan
of the Convention' theory of federal jurisdiction").
I11. See Marshall, supra note 7, at 1356-71. It should be noted that Professor Marshall reads
the amendment as barring only those suits it refers to specifically.
112. See Fletcher, supra note 7, at 1077-78.
113. Amar, supra note 7, at 1482.
114. See Marshall, supra note 43, at 1386-87 & n.88.
115. See supra note 77.
116. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
117. Id. at 456.
118. Id.
119. See Brown, supra note 28, at 393.
120. This would be particularly true in the case of grant programs that are both large and basic,
such as public welfare. See Brown, Beyond Pennhurst-Protective Jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amend-
ment, and the Power of Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in Response to the Burger Court, 71
VA. L. REV. 343, 396 (1985) (discussing issue of unconstitutional conditions).
121. 415 U.S. 651, 672 (1974).
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matter is clouded by general spending power doctrine that treats states' partici-
pation in federal programs as always voluntary.' 22
The big question is Congress' power to abrogate in the exercise of its article
I powers. The Court in Fitzpatrick suggested that is a different context, and
described fourteenth amendment legislation as "grounded on the expansion of
Congress' powers-with the corresponding diminution of state sovereignty."'
12 3
Yet the same could be said of any article I power. The grant of that power to
Congress marks a "diminution" of state power in the area.1 24 Because Congress
can displace the states altogether, making them amenable to federal suit under
article I-based norms hardly seems a greater invasion of sovereignty.
Before Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 125 decided in 1989, the decisions on
article I abrogation were ambiguous at best. The general pattern had been to
treat the eleventh amendment as conferring a form of constitutional protection
upon the states, to declare, or assume for purposes of the case, that Congress can
remove the protection, and then to find that Congress had not spoken with suffi-
cient clarity to conclude that it intended to do so. 126 Thus, the Court had been
finessing the ultimate question of how an article I statute could override a consti-
tutional guarantee. It also was avoiding the question of how abrogation theory
was consistent with Hans.
Apart from the question whether Congress had spoken clearly enough in a
specific statute, the general debate within the Court was largely over Hans itself.
Commentators saw signs of change in the 1987 decision in Welch v. Texas De-
partment of Highways and Public Transportation,127 an article I abrogation
case.128 Only four justices reasserted the validity of Hans. 129 There were the
usual four dissents.130 The ninth vote was Justice Scalia.131 He found it unnec-
essary to reach the Hans question because Congress had enacted the statute in
question at a time when Hans was understood as a correct statement of the
law. 132 It is not clear whether he agreed that Congress had not spoken plainly
enough to subject a state to private suit in federal court or whether he doubted it
could do so under article I at all. It is hard to read his brief opinion as inspired
by doubts about Hans itself. Academics, however, saw the stage as set for a
122. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923).
123. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976).
124. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2282 (plurality opinion) (discussing commerce clause as expan-
sion of federal power and contraction of state power).
125. 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989) (plurality opinion).
126. E.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (plurality
opinion); Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973) (eleventh amend-
ment bars suit against state in federal court by state employee suing under Fair Labor Standards
Act).
127. 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (plurality opinion) (eleventh amendment bars suit against state in fed-
eral court by state employee suing under Jones Act).
128. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 43, at 1374.
129. Welch, 483 U.S. at 486 (plurality opinion). The plurality consisted of Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, and Justices White, Powell and O'Connor.
130. Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Welch, 483
U.S. at 521 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 495 (Scalia, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 496 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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reconsideration of Hans and saw Union Gas as the likely vehicle. 133 No such
thing happened. Union Gas perpetuates the Hans framework but underscores
the difficulties of fitting abrogation theory within that framework as well as the
serious conceptual problems within abrogation theory itself.
B. Union Gas-New Debate, Any Majority?
The Reporter of Decisions' syllabus in Union Gas gives the reader a good
sense of where the Court stands on eleventh amendment issues. The last para-
graph provides as follows:
Brennan, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which Marshall,
Blackmun, Stevens, and Scalia, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect
to Part III, in which Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined.
Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion. White, J., filed an opinion con-
curring in the judgment, in Part I of which Rehnquist, C.J., and
O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Scalia J., filed an opinion concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part, in Parts II, III, and IV of which
Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ., joined. O'Connor,
J., filed a dissenting opinion. 134
Clearly we have a divided Court, but that always has been the case. The ques-
tion is whether the Court's views are in transition away from Hans.
At issue in Union Gas was the possible liability of a state in damages to a
private party who had been sued by the federal government under the Superfund
legislation. 135 When the private party sought to join the state as a third-party
defendant, that portion of the suit presented the Hans questions directly. The
initial question was whether the relevant statutory scheme clearly authorized
suits against states. As in earlier cases, the Court split over this issue; five jus-
tices found that the clear statement test was met.' 36 The original statute in-
cluded states within the general definition of persons who could be sued.137
However, eleventh amendment precedent made clear that such a general state-
ment was not enough to authorize private damage actions. 138 The key provision
was thus a 1986 amendment that excluded state liability in cases of involuntary
assumption of control over facilities, but provided that
the exclusion provided under this paragraph shall not apply to any
state or local government which has caused or contributed to the re-
lease or threatened release of a hazardous substance from the facility,
and such a state or local government shall be subject to the provisions
of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both proce-
133. Eg., Shreve, supra note 41, at 601-02.
134. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2276 (1989).
135. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
136. This was the plurality of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, plus Justice
Scalia.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982) (amended 1986).
138. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2291 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (discussing Employees v.
Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973)).
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durally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity .... 139
Justice Scalia joined with the anti-Hans wing to provide five votes for the propo-
sition that this language was dispositive as to congressional intent to make pri-
vate parties liable.140
The debate then shifted to the question that the Court previously had
avoided: whether Congress could abrogate state immunity in an enactment
under the article I commerce power. On this point, a different majority emerged
to hold that it could. Justice Brennan, writing for the group of four justices who
had opposed Hans, purported to apply Hans. 141 He did so in ways that make
one wonder whether anything is left of that case. He described the eleventh
amendment as conferring immunity on states, but found in prior cases clear
authority for Congress to abrogate that immunity under any of its powers. Fitz-
patrick was the only direct support. 142 For Justice Brennan, the important point
was not that Fitzpatrick involved the fourteenth amendment, but that it involved
a grant of power to Congress, thus taking something away from the states.
143
He treated all grants of power to Congress as plenary, refusing to treat the four-
teenth amendment as somehow "ultraplenary."
144
What is striking about the Brennan opinion is the ease with which he en-
grafted onto the Hans framework his own prior views about state immunity.
Perhaps the Constitution was passed against a background of state immunity,
and perhaps Hans was right in holding that "the principle of sovereign immu-
nity reflected in the Eleventh Amendment rendered the States immune from
suits for monetary damages in federal court even where jurisdiction was pre-
mised on the presence of a federal question." 145 The point is that the states
waived whatever they had been given by surrendering it in the constitutional
plan of grants of power to Congress. 14 6 The validity of congressional legislation
always depends on whether it was acting within one of its powers. Thus as far as
immunity is concerned, what the Constitution gives to states with one hand it
takes away with the other. Justice Brennan did distinguish the statute involved
in Hans-the Judiciary Act of 1875-on the ground that it "merely gave effect
to the grant of federal question jurisdiction under Article III, which was not self-
executing."' 147 As suggested earlier, this is not much of a distinction. 148 Article
139. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, Pub. L. No.
99-499, § 101(20)(D), 100 Stat. 1613, 1615 (1986).
140. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2295-96 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Scalia was the only member of the pro-Hans wing to take this position. Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices Kennedy and O'Connor joined with Justice White who dissented on the clear
statement issue. He found no specific authorization for private suits against states in the original
statute. At most this language would have permitted the United States to sue. He criticized the
majority for relying on a later amendment that dealt primarily with an exclusion from liability. Id.
at 2289-94 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
141. Id. at 2277 (plurality opinion).
142. For a discussion of Fitzpatrick, see supra text accompanying notes 116-18.
143. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2282 (plurality opinion).
144. Id. (plurality opinion).
145. Id. at 2277 (plurality opinion).
146. Id. at 2281 (plurality opinion).
147. Id. at 2283 (plurality opinion).
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III requires congressional action to put a federal structure into place, just as
every other grant of power does. 149 Justice Brennan also recognized principles
of clear statement as a form of limit on congressional power to abrogate) 50
Still, his opinion is a nice illustration of how abrogation theory can render Hans
a practical nullity. The four conservative justices who dissented did not miss
this point. As Justice Scalia put it, the plurality used abrogation theory "to fight
the Hans ... battle all over again-but this time to win it-on the field of the
Commerce Clause." 151 Justice Scalia would have allowed Congress to abrogate
only when it is exercising its powers under the fourteenth amendment. Even
Justice White, who provided the crucial fifth vote on abrogation under article I,
stated that he disagreed with much of Justice Brennan's opinion, although he
offered no specifics.1 52
It is hard to see Union Gas as the clear resolution that many had sought.
Hans is alive and well, except that it contains the proverbial hole through which
one can drive a truck. Justice Scalia is probably right that the battle over article
I abrogation will be fought again, 153 especially given Justice White's apparent
reservations. How clear Congress must be to set aside state immunity also will
continue to divide the Court, as it did in five cases during the last term alone.15 4
Perhaps most intriguing is whether the Court will recast the eleventh amend-
ment debate in subconstitutional terms. To do so would remove a number of
obstacles currently blocking the path to clear analysis. It also would force the
Court to admit the extent to which Hans has been cast aside.
IV. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE POST-UNION GAS-
THREE PROBLEMS
The previous statement may seem surprising. After all, in Union Gas the
whole Court purported to accept Hans.155 However, it seems clear that the
Brennan wing's preference remains to overrule it. 156 Short of that, they will use
the Hans framework when they can to subject states to suit in federal court. The
148. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
149. Strictly speaking, Justice Brennan's opinion is largely limited to congressional power under
the commerce clause, as opposed to a general discussion of other article I powers. For example, he
discusses that clause's ability to "displace state authority even where Congress has chosen not to
act." Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2284 (plurality opinion). However, he does cite lower court cases
upholding abrogation under other powers, and most of his analysis is applicable to the general article
I context.
150. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2277 (plurality opinion).
151. Id. at 2303 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
152. Id. at 2295 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
153. Id. at 2303 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He stated that reaching
the result in Union Gas through abrogation analysis "is an unstable victory... since that principle is
too much at war with itself to endure. We shall either overrule Hans in form as well as in fact, or
return to its genuine meaning." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
154. See supra note 27.
155. A possible exception to this statement is Justice Stevens. Although he concurred in Justice
Brennan's plurality opinion, he insisted that post-Hans limitations on suits against states can be
overridden by Congress because they represent judge-made law only, not because of anything in the
Constitution. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2286 (Stevens, J., concurring).
156. See Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2403 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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one thing the whole Court does agree on is abrogation theory, although there is
disagreement as to how far it goes. Abrogation theory then might be the build-
ing block of a compromise position: a midpoint between Hans and giving the
states nothing at all. Looking at the matter this way poses three doctrinal
problems.
A. Immunity as Subconstitutional
The starting point is whether the eleventh amendment can be recast as real,
but as less than constitutional, in status. Justice Stevens took this step in an
insightful concurring opinion in Union Gas.157 He distinguished the class of
cases covered by the literal text of the eleventh amendment from "the defense of
sovereign immunity that the Court has added to the text of the amendment in
cases like Hans."'158 The latter cases represent a judge-made doctrine designed
to further interests of federal-state comity. 159 This body of law is like that
which has grown up under Younger v. Harris.16° As such, it is reversible by
Congress.
The pro-Hans majority never has conceded any of this. It insists that cur-
rent eleventh amendment principles flow from the Constitution. Yet it never has
explained the paradox of abrogation adequately, except in the limited context of
Fitzpatrick.161 There is precedent for Justice Stevens' approach in other areas.
Besides Younger, one might cite the extensive body of fourth amendment exclu-
sionary jurisprudence. 162 The Court repeatedly describes these cases as resting
on judge-made rules thought to further fourth amendment goals. 163 Perhaps the
current body of eleventh amendment doctrine is an example of what Professor
Monaghan calls "constitutional common law."' 164 Monaghan posits the exist-
ence of "a substructure of substantive, procedural and remedial rules drawing
their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various constitutional
provisions; in short, a constitutional common law subject to amendment, modifi-
cation, or even reversal by Congress." 165 Monaghan's thesis is not without its
problems. 166 How, for example, does one tell whether a particular rule is of this
sort when the Court has not indicated one way or another? The fact that Con-
gress seeks to overturn it cannot be determinative. That would turn "constitu-
tional common law" into a circular self-fulfilling promise. In addition, there is
the nagging question whether Congress in overturning a subconstitutional rule
must replace it with something adequate to protect the interests involved. Still,
157. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2286 (Stevens, J., concurring).
158. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 2287-88 (Stevens, J., concurring).
160. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
161. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1976).
162. E.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
163. E.g., id. at 348.
164. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).
165. Id. at 2-3.
166. See, e.g., Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARv. L.
REV. 1117 (1978).
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Monaghan's thesis has general appeal and appears to fit the eleventh amendment
context nicely. It explains the source of the extant rules and justifies congres-
sional abrogation of them.
Several revisionist scholars have reached somewhat similar results, at least
to the extent of directing the search away from the eleventh amendment as a
constitutional imperative. 167 Their premise is that the Hans result is not alto-
gether untenable; it reflects a legitimate concern for the federal-state balance, a
concern that the federal "remedial structure not intrude unduly on the perform-
ance of other branches and levels of government." 168 One commentator views
state immunity as an example of a broad-ranging, tenth amendment-based prin-
ciple of state sovereignty. 169 In the post-Garcia world, 170 this seems an unprom-
ising avenue from the point of view of the states. That case renders suspect any
notion of state sovereignty with teeth.1 71 Another critic of the Hans rationale
regards article III as "inviting because of its ambiguity," and "superior to the
eleventh amendment as an arena for accommodating countervailing concerns of
federal law enforcement and state sovereignty." 172 To propose this avenue for
reconstructing state immunity is to invite the Court to engage in the same ex-
tratextual analysis that has engendered such intense criticism of present doc-
trine. It also fails to provide an immediate answer to questions of congressional
power.
The most complete statement of an alternative, subconstitutional founda-
tion is Professor Jackson's advocacy of a form of state sovereignty as a principle
of federal common law.173 She sees this law as generated by background under-
standings about the roles of the two sovereigns174 and authorized by the grant to
the federal courts of the "judicial power." 175 That power includes a substantial
degree of choice over matters of remedies and forum allocation. 176 This sounds
like the Monaghan thesis, although Professor Jackson insists that the eleventh
amendment is not a source of the relevant understandings. 177 Because the
amendment is the only part of the Constitution that directly addresses suits
against states in federal court, this author's inclination is to view it as the pri-
mary source for any recast, subconstitutional body of post-Hans doctrine.
As Professor Jackson points out, a subconstitutional approach might leave
167. See authorities cited supra note 77.
168. Jackson, supra note 7, at 82.
169. Massey, supra note 7.
170. See supra note 68.
171. See Brown, supra note 28, at 376-79.
172. Shreve, supra note 41, at 613. It should be noted that this is only a tentative suggestion.
Professor Shreve's main goal is to shift the state sovereignty inquiry away from the eleventh
amendment.
173. As Professor Jackson notes, Professor Field's earlier work puts forward a somewhat similar
view. See Jackson, supra note 7, at 72 n.297. Without intending to minimize the earlier writings of
critics such as Professor Field, I have focused on revisionist articles that have appeared since 1980.
174. Id. at 76.
175. Id. at 84-87.
176. Id. at 82-104.
177. Id. at 75.
[Vol. 68
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
present outcomes in more or less their present forms. 178 Pure revisionists would
object that states do not even deserve this. More to the point, states can argue
that their interests are even further weakened by removing the current "consti-
tutional" cloak. This argument has force, but it should not obscure the point
that the real blow to state immunity is the Court's own acceptance of abrogation
theory. Whether current doctrine remains precariously grounded in the Consti-
tution-the upshot of Union Gas-or is recast as a subconstitutional matter, the
issue of possible limits on congressional power to abrogate will continue to dom-
inate the eleventh amendment debate.
B. The Nature of the Congressional Power Utilized as a Source of Limits
Union Gas does stand for the proposition that Congress' ability to abrogate
the states' immunity is the same under the article I commerce power as it is
under the fourteenth amendment, but this resolution may not be the last word
on the issue. It remains a post-Union Gas problem. The four justices who dis-
sented on that issue want to relitigate it. Justice White's fifth vote did not rest
on the plurality's rationale. The main reason for thinking that a majority may
yet emerge that distinguishes between article I power and fourteenth amend-
ment power is that without such a distinction very little is left of Hans. The case
for drawing the distinction is strengthened as long as the Court continues to
treat the states' immunity as flowing from the Constitution. Something else in
the Constitution must serve as the source of power to abrogate that immunity.
The fourteenth amendment is different from the other relevant parts of the
Constitution in two respects. 179 It came after both the eleventh amendment and
article 111.180 Thus the states in the fourteenth amendment may have consented
to a range of congressional powers over them that is different from the powers to
which they consented in the original constitutional plan. If it is the eleventh
amendment that gave the states immunity, they could have consented to the
removal of that immunity in the fourteenth amendment context while retaining
it as far as the earlier granted powers are concerned. Fitzpatrick rests on a sec-
ond important difference: the fourteenth amendment was passed to ensure na-
tional power over the operations of state governments.181 Thus it contemplated
inroads on their sovereignty including federal court enforcement of national
regulations.
As Justice Brennan pointed out in Union Gas, the timing argument is weak-
ened somewhat by the pro-Hans justices' consistent treatment of the eleventh
amendment as essentially resting on an understanding of state immunity which
pre-dated the original Constitution and was part of it.182 The emphasis is not on
178. Id. at 67.
179. See generally Jablonski, The Eleventh Amendment: An Affirmative Limitation on the Com-
merce Clause Power of Congress-A Doctrinal Foundation, 37 DE PAUL L. REv. 547 (1988). Per-
haps more than any other writer Mr. Jablonski has analyzed the arguments for power-based limits
on abrogation and supports such limits.
180. See Brown, supra note 28, at 384 n.188.
181. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1976).
182. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2283 (plurality opinion).
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the fact that the eleventh amendment came later. The Court has focused on the
intent of the framers of the Constitution, not the amendment, and treated the
latter as the restoration of an understanding misunderstood in Chisholm.'8 3 For
Justice Brennan, all granted powers are exercised in light of the Constitution's
background. Thus if Congress can abrogate under one power, as unanimously
held in Fitzpatrick, it can abrogate under all.184
Still, one can find plenty of references by the Court to the eleventh amend-
ment as the source of immunity doctrine.18 5 Perhaps the eleventh was an anti-
federalist victory designed to alter balances in the original Constitution. 186 Thus
it trumps what is contained in article I, and, in turn, might be trumped by the
fourteenth amendment. Indeed, it may not matter whether immunity comes
from article III or the eleventh amendment. The fourteenth postdates both.
The text of the eleventh, however, tied to article III of the original Constitution,
becomes crucial. The message, as broadened by Hans, is a general interdiction
of federal court suits against states. Unless countered by some other provision,
that interdiction applies to Congress in the exercise of any of its powers whether
the legislation is "necessary and proper" 187 to implement article I or "appropri-
ate"188 to implement the fourteenth amendment. The question becomes
whether the latter differs from the former in more than chronology.
Dissenting in Union Gas, Justice Scalia relied primarily on the notion that
the fourteenth amendment is qualitatively different from article I, in that it is
aimed squarely at sovereignty. 189 This seems the stronger argument for a
power-based distinction as well as a more faithful reading of Fitzpatrick.190 Ar-
ticle I powers affect state sovereignty indirectly by giving Congress the potential
authority to displace states in some fields.191 The fourteenth amendment is
aimed directly at how the states run their governments, both procedurally and
substantively. 192 Drawing this distinction however, smacks of National League
183. E.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 480-85 (1987) (plu-
rality opinion).
184. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2283 (plurality opinion).
185. E.g., Welch, 483 U.S. at 488-90 (plurality opinion).
186. See Marshall, supra note 43, at 1388.
187. The last clause of article I, § 8 states that the Congress shall have power "[tlo make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Depart-
ment or Officer thereof." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
188. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provision of this
article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
189. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2302 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). His
text suggests a historical argument-he describes the fourteenth amendment as "later" than the
eleventh, and also distinguishes the original Constitution from "provisions adopted subsequently"-
but he does not elaborate on it. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 116-18. Contra L. TRIDE, supra note 78, at 185-86.
191. It is true that as with negative commerce clause doctrine the mere conferral may displace
the states without exercise. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2284 (plurality opinion).
192. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The primary guarantees are substantive. The amendment for-
bids outcomes that abridge privileges and immunities of United States citizens, deprive persons of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, or which deny persons the equal protection of the
laws. Id. amend. XIV, § 1. However, sections 2 and 3 are aimed at state denials of suffrage and at
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of Cities v. Usery,193 which suggested that because of limitations derived from
notions of state sovereignty Congress had greater powers vis-A-vis the states
under the fourteenth amendment than under other powers.1 94 Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority overruled National League of Cities on
this very point.1 95 Moreover, even the National League of Cities Court admitted
that Congress could use the commerce clause to regulate "the States as
States." 196
Although the qualitative difference argument is stronger than the timing
argument for distinguishing between article I and the fourteenth amendment,
ultimately it is unsatisfactory. As Justice Brennan noted in Union Gas, any at-
tempt to treat some congressional powers as more "plenary" than others is
fraught with difficulties. 197 Thus the doctrine of Katzenbach v. Morgan 19 8-
that Congress can utilize the fourteenth amendment to expand constitutional
guarantees-has proved problematic at best. 199 Similarly, whether Congress'
power over the District of Columbia is superplenary has been a difficult question
for the Court.2° ° Justice Brennan's own attempt in Union Gas to distinguish the
power to create courts from other powers is hard to accept.2 01 The broad
message of Garcia is a negation of attempts to distinguish among powers. Be-
cause Garcia dealt with state sovereignty, its message is especially applicable to
the immunity debate.20 2
A further weakness of the fourteenth amendment argument is that the pro-
vision says nothing about departing from article III. If Fitzpatrick is correct that
Congress can abrogate under the fourteenth there is a good case to be made that
its other powers permit the same action.20 3 The fourteenth amendment-article I
distinction has proven attractive in the past, 2° 4 but it probably will not prevail
even if the Court continues to cast the debate in constitutional terms.
If the debate is recast in subconstitutional terms there would be even less
reason to draw such a distinction. 20 5 A key premise of such a recasting would
be that Congress can alter whatever federal-state balance the Court has
office holding by those who participate in or support rebellion against the United States. Id. amend.
XIV, §§ 2-3.
193. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
194. See id. at 852 n.17.
195. See Brown, supra note 28, at 378.
196. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
197. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2282 (plurality opinion).
198. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
199. See Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1983).
200. See Brown, Article III as a Fundamental Value-The Demise of Northern Pipeline and its
Implications for Congressional Power, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 62 n.74 (1988).
201. Justice Scalia referred to it as "gossamer." Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2299 (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
202. See Brown, supra note 28, at 388-89.
203. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2285-86 (plurality opinion).
204. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-95 (1978) (suggesting that Congress can authorize
attorney's fees awards against states because the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976
was passed pursuant to the fourteenth amendment).
205. See Jackson, supra note 7, at 108.
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drawn.20 6 Congress derives this authority not from the strength of one of its
powers as opposed to another but from the nature of what it is altering as not of
constitutional dimension. Thus, recasting the debate along these lines would
further weaken the states' position. Indeed, it would leave them with only one
set of limits: judicially developed requirements of a clear statement by Congress
of its intent to abrogate state immunity.
C. Clear Statement Rules as a Post-Union Gas Problem-The
Question of Authority
It must be remembered that Union Gas was the product of two different
majorities. Five justices found that Congress had the power to abrogate under
the commerce clause. Another five found that it had adequately expressed its
intention to do so. The more frequent pattern in eleventh amendment cases is
for the states to win on the latter issue. Two 1989 decisions illustrate the point.
Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance20 7 involved the
Bankruptcy Act. 20 8 This Act provides in part that:
notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity- (1) a provision
of this title that contains 'creditor,' 'entity,' or 'governmental unit' ap-
plies to governmental units .... 209
The conservative justices invoked clear statement principles, in the face of this
language, to block recovery by the trustee of a bankrupt's funds held by the
state.2 10 In Dellmuth v. Muth2 11 the issue was suits against states under the
Education of the Handicapped Act.2 12 The Act clearly authorizes civil actions
by parents unhappy with the education plan for their children. 2 13 The states'
substantial role under the Act suggests that many such suits would be brought
against them.2 14 Nonetheless, the five pro-Hans justices ordered dismissal on
eleventh amendment grounds. 215
What is at work here is an extraordinarily stringent standard of statutory
construction. 2 16 In Dellmuth the Court went so far as to suggest that any au-
thorization of suit might have to cite the eleventh amendment specifically to
206. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2286-89 (Stevens, J., concurring).
207. 109 S. Ct. 2818 (1989).
208. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
209. 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1988).
210. The majority's brief opinion is a relatively rote repetition of the strictness of the standard as
well as a reminder that legislative history cannot be utilized to satisfy clear statement requirements.
Hoffman, 109 S. Ct. at 2822-24.
211. 109 S. Ct. 2397 (1989).
212. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1420 (1988).
213. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1988).
214. See Dellmuth, 109 S. Ct. at 2403 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing "overarching respon-
sibility placed upon the States").
215. Id. at 2400-02 (majority opinion).
216. See id. at 2405 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court for adopting "strict drafting regu-
lations ... ruling out resort to legislative history and apparently also barring inferential reasoning
from text and structure").
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abrogate state immunity.217 The more general formation is that "Congress must
express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable lan-
guage in the statute itself."218 The Court has rejected use of legislative history
as a guide to congressional intent.219 The result is that clear statement is a re-
curring battleground and that the states win a substantial number of victories on
it.
This subsection focuses on where the Court gets the authority to impose
this heightened standard on Congress. The matter would be relatively straight-
forward if every eleventh amendment case involved solely the question of waiver
by the state of its immunity shield. The clear statement rule would ensure that
the state knew what it was getting into and knew directly from the face of the
most relevant federal document-the statute. This approach works in the con-
text of grant-in-aid programs.220 The state accepts the funds and attendant con-
ditions. It does not work when Congress imposes a regulatory regime upon
states that may include private damage suits to enforce federal norms. One
would have to engage in the transparent fiction that the state "chose" to enter
the area even if it represented a core governmental function such as the state
employees' retirement fund involved in Fitzpatrick.221 What is at work is, on
the one hand, an abrogation by Congress regardless of what the states do, and,
on the other, a rule of statutory construction which makes that abrogation hard
to accomplish.
Is the stringent clear statement rule somehow justified by treating state im-
munity as derived from the Constitution? The Court often describes the immu-
nity in this way.222 The most immediate analogy is found in another
constitutional context: statutes that might be read to preclude judicial review of
administrative decisions involving constitutional rights.223 Here the Court has
imposed a standard of "'clear and convincing' evidence" that Congress in-
tended to cut off review. 224 The Court has hinted that these cases are relevant in
the eleventh amendment context.225 Yet even the administrative review cases
permit recourse to legislative history and other tools of statutory construc-
tion.226 More to the point, they are based on substantial doubts that Congress
217. Id. at 2401 (citing 1986 amendments to Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1)
(Supp. 1987), which refers to eleventh amendment in removing state immunity).
218. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).
219. See Dellmuth, 109 S. Ct. at 2401; Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance,
109 S. Ct. 2818, 2824 (1989).
220. See Brown, supra note 28, at 385-88 (discussing application of eleventh amendment to grant
programs enacted under the spending power).
221. See, eg., Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2303 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
222. E.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (referring to states' "constitutional pro-
tection under the Eleventh Amendment").
223. E.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (prohibition against judicial review of statute
dealing with veterans' rights not extended to actions challenging the constitutionality of a statute).
224. Id. at 373-74.
225. The Court cited Johnson v. Robison and its clear statement rule in Dellmuth v. Muth, 109
S. Ct. 2397, 2402 (1989). See Field, Part II, supra note 7, at 1251-52.
226. See, eg., Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670-73 (1986)
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can cut off review in constitutional cases. 227 Abrogation theory rests on the
notion that Congress has the power to abrogate. Ultra strict clear statement
rules serve to temper this power, suggesting that state immunity is the preferred
constitutional value.
A frequently cited justification for clear statement principles is that they
ensure that Congress has considered states' interests. If all this means is that
Congress is presumed reluctant to disturb the prevailing federal-state balance-a
general presumption by the way22 -then it is hard to see why normal rules of
statutory construction will not provide that assurance. 229 Professor Tribe goes
further: "the clear statement rule would ... ensure that attempts to limit state
power will be unmistakable, thereby structuring the legislative process to allow
the centrifugal forces in Congress the greatest opportunity to protect the states'
interests. '230 Where does the Court get the authority to "structure" the
processes of Congress? The answer must be something of constitutional dimen-
sion. This reinforces the notion that if the current eleventh amendment balance,
including strict clear statement, is to be retained, Hans still must be viewed as
imposing constitutional principles.
What would happen to clear statement under a subconstitutional approach?
In that case there would be no doubt of Congress' power;23 1 at best a presump-
tion of doubt that it intended to exercise it would obtain.232 State immunity
would be an important value, but the question would be only how to discern
whether Congress intended to set it aside. As Professor Jackson has noted, the
clear statement rule might be rejected altogether or a less stringent "clear evi-
dence" rule put in its place.233 Either way, the states would lose a lot from the
reconceptualization.
Perhaps the Monaghan thesis234 operates here to justify the existing strin-
gent rules, even if state immunity is treated as a form of constitutional common
law. Monaghan suggests that the Court has a role to play after Congress has
acted in this domain. The judiciary can evaluate the effectiveness of what Con-
(Court used legislative history as confirmation of Congress' intention that judicial review of adminis-
trative action be available unless contrary intention is clearly expressed).
227. See Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("a statute that would have the
effect of precluding any sort of review in an independent judicial forum... would be flatly inconsis-
tent with the doctrine of separation of powers implicit in our constitutional scheme"). The agency
review cases also are based on the general administrative law principle that agency decisions are
presumptively reviewable. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (statutory
plan of Food and Drug regulations not intended to cut off judicial review).
228. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) ("unless Congress conveys its purpose
clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance").
229. See, eg., Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2405-06 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Normal rules of statutory construction would also seem adequate to meet the Court's concerns about
expanding federal jurisdiction. Jackson, supra note 7, at 110-11 n.440.
230. L. TRIBE, supra note 78, at 187 (emphasis added).
231. See, eg., Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2286-89 (Stevens, J., concurring).
232. Jackson, supra note 7, at 112-13.
233. Id. at 110-11. The "clear evidence" rule would acknowledge Congress as "the primary
protector of States' interests in their own sovereignty." Id. at 111.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 164-66,
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gress has put in the place of judicially created constitutional common law. 235
Perhaps current clear statement rules serve as a proxy for such an evaluation.
The Court gives the states something-a set of difficult obstacles Congress must
overcome-to compensate for the constitutional shield that the states have
lost.2 36 Defenders of state interests probably would find this argument unproved
and doctrinally questionable. Thus, as with the question of power-based limits
on abrogation, it is important from the state standpoint that the Hans frame-
work retain its constitutional foundation.
V. CONCLUSION
Eleventh amendment law remains as confusing and perplexing as ever. The
academic assault on Hans has not succeeded. While the revisionists may not
have won that battle, they largely have won the war for national supremacy over
state immunity. Congress apparently can remove the states' shield from suit in
federal court under any of its powers. Abrogation theory is the Trojan Horse
that makes this possible.
Abrogation theory, however, is doctrinally unsatisfactory and generates dif-
ficult questions of its own, particularly those of power-based limits and the valid-
ity of ultra stringent clear statement rules. The Court could clear up much of
the doctrinal uncertainty by recasting Hans in subconstitutional terms. Yet to
do so would further undermine the states' position. One should not expect such
a step from a federalistic Court. Nor should one welcome it if one sees merit in a
compromise solution which permits substantial federal enforcement of federal
norms, yet shows concern for state treasuries and the role of state courts in
enforcing those norms. As long as the clear statement rule remains in force,
however shaky its foundations, the states get real protection while national
supremacy will ultimately prevail. The Court's presumption is that Congress
cares about the states; statutes are applied accordingly. It is true that the likely
result of current doctrine is a continuing parade of split decisions not just over
clear statement, but also over power-based limitations and the validity of the
Hans framework itself. This is, admittedly, conceptually untidy. Perhaps it is
the best one can hope for when an immovable force meets an irresistible object,
so to speak.
235. See Monaghan, supra note 164, at 26 (the appropriate question to ask would be whether
"the net result of the legislative change constitute[d] an 'adequate' substitute for what the Court
required"). But see id. at 29 ("where the Court's rule is perceived to have gone too far, it can be
rejected or modified by the political process without the necessity of a constitutional amendment").
236. Cf. Brown, supra note 28, at 394 (describing eleventh amendment rules as a form of post-
Garcia process federalism that replaces the substantive federalism of National League of Cities).
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